A Glacier That Became a Tsunami
The disaster in Nuwakot did not travel to Antalya. It came down into the valley instead, in August, as flash floods and landslides, and it killed more than 1,500 people. Nepal’s environment minister, Gita Chaudhary, brought the event into the conference hall and gave it the name her country now uses for it: “We call the catastrophic climate change event we suffered a mountain tsunami.” The cause was a melting glacier, which sent a landslide down into the district. “We lost people, we lost lives, we lost property,” she said. Nepal is now working on rehabilitation, reconstruction and the rebuilding of infrastructure. Then she drew the line exactly where a budget cannot go: “But the communities, the culture, the lives, we cannot revive.” That sentence captures the accounting problem at the centre of the annual UN climate talks. Reconstruction is a cost that can be estimated, financed and paid out in tranches — instalments of a payment released in stages. Culture and lives are not. A summit that measures its progress in negotiated text and announced pledges is therefore deaf to the part of the loss that cannot be itemised. The Nepali case is not an outlier at these talks; it is the template. The physical world is already delivering outcomes that the negotiating text is still trying to describe.
The number that framed the first week came from Climate Action Tracker. Its report found that current policies put the planet on a path to 2.7C of heating by the end of this century. That is slightly more than the group expected last year. It is also far above the 1.5C that world leaders have promised to hold. Two figures, and the entire architecture of the talks falls into view. The 1.5C is the promise: a temperature threshold governments have publicly committed to defend. The 2.7C is the forecast: what the policies actually in force deliver, as opposed to the ones announced and never implemented. “Current policies” is the operative phrase, because it excludes pledges that exist only on paper. The distance between promise and forecast is not a gap in rhetoric; it is a gap in law, in subsidy, and in steel that has not been built. The word irrecoverable matters here. A temporary overshoot — temperatures pushed past the line and then brought back — is a different physical and political object from one that cannot be reversed. The finding, in other words, is not merely that the target is set to be missed. It is that the target may cease to function as a reference point at all, and every later negotiation then begins from a baseline that has already shifted.
Into that arithmetic walked Greta Thunberg, 23, at her first appearance at the annual UN climate talks in five years. Her formulation was a grammatical correction aimed at the summit’s vocabulary of risk and vulnerability. “The planet is not dying, it is being killed,” she said, and she supplied the agent: the planet is “being killed by the very same people thought to come to our rescue.” [1] The difference between dying and being killed is the difference between a natural process and an accountable act. Dying assigns no one. Being killed assigns someone — and an agent can be named, taxed, sued, voted out or ordered to pay. She extended the argument well past the atmosphere: “We are heading towards a future of more genocides and more ecocides and the complete compromise of our basic rights and where basic necessities become luxuries.” [1] The mechanism she described is not primarily moral but distributional: scarcity of the basics converts into price, and price converts into entitlement, so water, food and shelter stop being infrastructure and become purchases. That is the point at which climate policy stops being environmental policy and becomes fiscal policy, security policy and human rights law in the same breath. She framed the obligation accordingly: “When our human rights are being threatened by states and other institutions, it’s our duty to stand up and be the adult in the room and fight for everyone’s human rights.” And she closed the door on the alternative: “No one is coming to our rescue.” [1] The framing is contestable. The audience was not: she delivered it to the same governments she was describing, on the fourth day of a two-week summit they convened.
Promises Priced in Electrons and Dollars
What a summit of this kind can actually produce is narrower than what it discusses. One of the main potential promises on the table in Antalya is a goal for countries to further electrify their economies. Electrification means moving work currently done by burning fuel — in cars, in heating, in factories — onto the electricity grid. Whether that lowers emissions depends entirely on what generates the power, which is why the drafting fight here is about adjectives rather than verbs. Some countries want the agreement text to specify that the electricity will be derived from clean energy sources. Others, by implication, would accept a target that counts electrons without auditing where they came from. A grid fed by coal and a grid fed by wind produce the identical kilowatt-hour and very different tonnes of carbon dioxide. So the same phrase, “further electrify,” can describe two opposite energy policies. COP31, the 31st annual UN climate conference, is jointly presided over by Turkey and Australia, so two governments rather than one hold the pen and the calendar. A joint presidency means a text has to satisfy two sets of domestic constituencies before it can satisfy the room.
The second instrument is subtraction rather than addition: a phaseout of fossil fuels. A phaseout means a scheduled end to the sale and use of coal, oil and gas, with a date attached to it. Campaigners have criticised governments for the slow pace of emissions cuts, and for failing so far to rally around such a phaseout in the negotiations. The two items travel together, and the reason one of them keeps slipping is structural. Building clean generation is a promise of gain, distributed to whoever hosts the new capacity and whoever manufactures it. Ending fossil generation is a promise of loss, concentrated on whoever owns the existing assets. Concentrated losses organise politically while diffuse gains do not. This asymmetry, rather than any shortage of information about the physics, is what keeps the subtracting item off the agreed page. A target to build is compatible with continued burning. A date to stop is not. Every delegation in the hall is negotiating which of the two its neighbours can live with.
The third instrument is cash. Leaders from several poor and low-emitting countries urged rich polluters to stump up more money, and demanded emissions cuts deep enough to keep any overshoot of the temperature thresholds low and short. “Low and short” is a precise request, and it is a concession to arithmetic rather than a slogan. Given a 1.5C target that current policies already exceed, the argument is no longer about avoiding overshoot; it is about limiting its size and its duration. Every year spent above the threshold accumulates damage that returning below it later does not undo. That is the difference between a budget that is overspent and one that is overspent and then repaid in a weaker currency. The finance demand and the mitigation demand — cutting the emissions that cause warming, as opposed to adapting to its effects — are therefore the same demand, stated in two units. Money buys adaptation now, meaning spending to cope with damage that is already happening or locked in; cuts determine how much adaptation will eventually be required. A country that emits little and loses much is asking to be compensated for a harm it did not cause and cannot prevent on its own. The invoice is not charity. It is a claim about who filled the atmosphere and who is standing under it.
The fourth instrument is litigation, and it currently runs in the opposite direction. An analysis found that polluting companies have sued governments for nearly half a trillion dollars in secret courts. The mechanism matters more than the total: a compensation claim functions as a price on regulation itself, because a government that phases out a fuel may face a claim for the value of the asset it has just stranded — a plant, mine or well that still has book value but can no longer be operated profitably because of a policy. That converts climate policy from a public decision into a liability calculation, and it moves the argument into a forum where the public cannot watch. The absence of an audience removes the political cost that normally disciplines a legal position. Taken together, the four instruments form a hierarchy: a target that may not specify clean power, a phaseout that has not been agreed, finance that has not been paid, and claims that have already been filed. What the summit produces is therefore a test not of what governments intend, but of what they are willing to be held to.
Empty Chairs and One Prime Minister
Attendance is the cheapest instrument available, and this summit demonstrated exactly how cheap. Andy Burnham, the British prime minister, was the only G7 leader to attend — the G7 being the grouping of seven large advanced economies. That single fact carries more information about the state of the climate regime than any paragraph of the draft text. Burnham used his speech to describe a record hot summer at home and to reject the word normal for it: the heat was “not normal.” “The climate crisis is not a distant threat; it is upon us all now, devastating lives and livelihoods everywhere,” he said. He promised that the UK would reach net zero emissions, which means a balance in which the greenhouse gases added to the atmosphere equal those removed from it — a target of equivalence, not of absence. He also backed the proposal for countries to further electrify their economies. Beth John, a climate justice adviser at Oxfam GB, called the appearance a positive signal and then priced it. “Showing up is not enough: a crisis of this scale needs substantive action, not just signals,” she said. “The real test of climate leadership is delivery, not declarations.” That is the correct test, and it is also the one no summit can administer to itself.
The largest absence from the room was the United States, which sent no delegation. Donald Trump has withdrawn the country from the international climate framework, derided climate science as a “hoax,” and claimed he would not permit any new wind turbines. Those three positions are not equivalent, and the third is the most damaging to the summit’s central proposal. A country that refuses new wind turbines cannot electrify its economy on clean power, whatever its targets say on paper. The absence drew a rebuke from John Kerry, the former US secretary of state, who travelled to Antalya with 20 Democratic members of Congress and two state governors. Kerry called Trump “the biggest loser we’ve seen in a long time” on these issues. He framed the cost in two parts: action scrapped at home, and the clean energy race ceded to China. The second half is the economic half, and it is the half that usually moves votes. A country that exits a growing market does not stop the market; it stops being a supplier inside it, and the capacity, the supply chain and the standards migrate to whoever stays. Withdrawal is therefore not a neutral act for the industries that remain.
The Democratic midterm victories — US Congressional elections held halfway through a presidential term — raised expectations at the summit that Washington would re-engage. Gavin Newsom, the governor of California, spent his appearance lowering them. “I don’t want to romanticise what this will mean,” he said, adding: “I don’t expect they’ll do anything but double down.” To double down, in this context, means the remaining presidential term is more likely to intensify the current policy than to reverse it. His forecast is a statement about timing rather than preference: a fixed two-year window, an administration with no further election to contest, and an incentive structure pointing one way. For negotiators, that means the largest historical emitter sits out the rest of the term regardless of what its legislators say in Antalya. The presence of 20 members of Congress and two governors is a signal of intent from a party, not a commitment from a state. That distinction is the difference between a promise that can be ratified and a preview of one.
The host country applied its own filter to the guest list. Turkey has repeatedly accused Israel of genocide and refused to invite the country’s leadership to Antalya; Israel denies that it has committed genocide and insists it has fought a legitimate war to safeguard its own security. Into that gap stepped Mohammad Mustafa, the prime minister of Palestine, whose speech drew a standing ovation from the delegates. He described the environmental cost of a three-year war. “Israel’s restrictions on access to land, water and natural resources have compounded Palestine’s climate challenges,” he said, setting out how destruction to water supplies, sewerage and farmland had worsened environmental and health risks together. The mechanism is cumulative rather than singular: a destroyed sewer system produces a health emergency and a contamination event, on top of a climate that was already difficult. Rebuilding it competes for the same finance as adaptation, the queue that poor and low-emitting countries had spent the week complaining about. The war thus enters the climate ledger twice — once as harm, and once as a claim on the money required to answer the harm. A standing ovation measures the sympathies of the room, not the obligations of the text.
